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Please note: The final version of this chapter appeared in Markus Kaim (ed.), Great Powers 
and Regional Orders. The United States and the Persian Gulf, Ashgate 2008 
 
The Domestic Politics of U.S. Policy towards the Persian Gulf  
Dr. Lars Berger, Salford University/Greater Manchester 
 
1.   Introduction           
 
The following essay takes a closer look at those inter- and intra-branch dynamics of the U.S. 
political system that relate to Washington’s policy toward Iraq. According to LeLoup and 
Shull, the question of whether president and Congress are able to exert influence depends on 
such factors as the domestic political climate, public expectations, the result of presidential 
and congressional elections, as well as the influence of interest groups, intra-executive dy-
namics and the specific content of the policies formulated by the White House.1 This paper 
will therefore focus on the politics of the run-up and aftermath of the U.S.-led regime change 
in Iraq rather than on the respective policies themselves. 
 
2. The Politics of Dual Containment   
 
With regard to the regional theaters of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Persian Gulf, the Clin-
ton Administration chose to pursue an active policy in the former. Lacking better alternatives, 
the policy of dual containment of Iraq and Iran was announced by National Security Council 
official Martin Indyk in May 1993. This approach rested on the “necessity of an informal alli-
ance” between Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller GCC countries as well as Turkey 
to counter “radical regimes” and “extremism”.2 It thus aimed at establishing a cost efficient 
way of securing U.S. interests in the Gulf, while most diplomatic and political energies were 
spent on the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians. Even though both Iraq and Iran had 
to be contained, Martin Indyk made it clear in his speech that while the United States gov-
ernment was not opposed to the nature of Islamic government in Teheran, but rather to “spe-
cific aspects of the Iranian regime’s behaviour”, it deemed the regime of Saddam Hussein to 
                                                 
1 See Lance T. LeLoup/ Steven A. Shull, The President and Congress. Collaboration and Combat in National 
Policymaking, Boston/ Ma. 1999, p. 19ff. 
2 Dr. Martin Indyk, “The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East”, The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy’s Soref Symposium, Washington, D.C. May 18, 1993, (accessible at 
www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubs/soref/indyk.htm). 
 2 
be “criminal, beyond the pale of international society and, in our judgement, irredeemable.”3 
This distinction would set the tone for most of the discussions on U.S. policy toward the Gulf 
region during the 1990s and leading up to the military campaign against the Iraqi regime in 
early 2003.  
From the end of the Cold War to the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, 
D.C., in 2001, the situation in Congress was in stark contrast from any other period since the 
United States became a global power. The lack of an overall public consensus on what the 
most urgent threat to U.S. national security was and the abundance of foreign policy crises 
(ranging from Somalia and Haiti to Bosnia and Kosovo) which did not have the capacity to 
significantly strengthen the president’s profile on matters of foreign policy provided Congress 
with more leeway in its attempts to challenge the president. In the end, one observer already 
saw a “bullied pulpit”, in which, for the first time since the rise of the United States to the 
status of a superpower, the president was seriously weakened with regard to the implementa-
tion of his foreign policy agenda against a hostile legislature.4 
In addition, the so-called “Republican Revolution” of 1994 launched a new period of congres-
sional partisanship. The regionalization of the political map of the United States came full 
circle with the decline of conservative and moderate Democrats in the South as well as mod-
erate and liberal Republicans in the North. Furthermore, while the dominant foreign policy 
experience that shaped the attitudes of many Democrats had been the Vietnam War, many 
newly elected Republicans came to Washington with their views on foreign policy having 
been formed by the Reagan administration, which, in their view, had brought about an end to 
the Cold War with a focus on clear moral guidelines and an inclination to rely on U.S. mili-
tary power.  
It was against this domestic background that the region of the Persian Gulf received relatively 
little attention. This did not mean, however, that Congress would refrain from making its 
voice or at least the voice of its majorities heard. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995, which was passed and signed when the Democratic Party still 
had control of both the White House and Congress, included a section expressing the consen-
sus that the United States should “continue to advocate the maintenance of Iraq’s territorial 
integrity and the transition to a unified, democratic Iraq.”5 In reaction to the short-term mili-
tary escalations of the later part of the 1990s broad majorities of Republicans and Democrats 
alike began supporting bills that included direct references to the possibility of unilateral mili-
                                                 
3 Indyk, The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East. 
4 Sebastian Mallaby, The Bullied Pulpit, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, January/ February 2000, pp. 2-8. 
5 The texts of this and other bills mentioned here can be found at http://thomas.loc.gov. 
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tary action. At the beginning of the inspection crisis in November 1997, the House of Repre-
sentatives unanimously passed House Resolution 322 which called for multilateral or unilat-
eral action if peaceful and diplomatic efforts to ensure Iraqi compliance with United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction failed. Senate 
Joint Resolution 54 of August 1998, passed with unanimous consent in the Senate and by a 
majority of 407 to 6 in the House, declared that, by evicting weapons inspectors, Iraq was in 
“material breach” of the cease-fire agreement6 and urged the president to take all appropriate 
actions to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations.  
The Iraq Liberation Act, itself the most widely cited piece of legislation of this period, was 
passed by a vote of 360 to 38 in the House of Representatives and with a simple voice vote in 
the Senate.7 This act, which became law on October 31st 1998, contended that “(i)t should be 
the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam 
Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to re-
place that regime.” In order to achieve this goal, Congress authorized the president to provide 
“Iraqi democratic opposition groups” to be designated by him with assistance totalling $97 
million. It is important to note that the final section of the bill made it clear that the act was 
not to be construed in any way as relating to the use of U.S. armed forces except for the provi-
sion of military equipment and training to Iraqi opposition groups. With regard to the imple-
mentation of the act, the Clinton administration’s attempt to form as broad a coalition of op-
position groups as possible differed from the point of view of the Republican leadership in 
Congress which envisioned providing most of the appropriated funds to the Iraqi National 
Congress (INC) headed by Ahmed Chalabi.8 In the end, the main political result of this ini-
tially mostly rhetorical measure was to strengthen those Iraqi ex-pats whose faulty intelli-
gence information came to form the backbone of the Bush administration’s public rational for 
a war against Iraq.  
When President Clinton ordered military action against Iraq in response to the end of the  
United Nations weapons inspections in the country, the House of Representatives passed 
House Resolution 612 by a vote of 417 to 5 expressing its support for the U.S. armed forces 
deployed to the region and reaffirming the language of the Iraq Liberation Act. In an article 
                                                 
6 This term would gain importance during the debate on the aborted U.N. inspections leading up to the third Gulf 
War. 
7 The occurrence of a voice vote in the Senate can be interpreted in two ways. First, it can demonstrate the lack 
of any controversy regarding to the bill, since it is only considered agreed upon if there is not a single objection. 
Secondly, unanimously passing a bill by voice vote could also indicate that the bill in its wording was not con-
sidered important enough for any possible opponent to go on official record by forcing a roll-call vote that would 
result in an exact tally of yeas and nays. 
8 Scott Peterson, US taps dissidents to press Saddam, in: Christian Science Monitor, November 30, 1998; Vernon 
Loeb, Saddam’s Iraqi Foes Heartened by Clinton, in: Washington Post, November 16, 1998. 
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published in 1998 that tried to stress the Clinton administration’s case for military action 
against targets in Sudan and Afghanistan in response to the bombings of the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright counted the “struggle against 
terror”, the danger posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, North Korea’s weapons activities, and 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among the greatest challenges to U.S. leader-
ship in the world.9 With that assessment Albright had the broader public on her side. Accord-
ing to a survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1998, respondents 
ranked “international terrorism” (84 percent), “chemical and biological weapons” (76 percent) 
and “unfriendly countries gaining access to nuclear weapons” (75 percent) as the top three 
“threats to vital national interests”.10 This indicates that international terrorism (especially its 
Islamist version) and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogues states had 
already been part of the elite and public discourse for nearly a decade when the tragic events 
of September 11th, 2001 occurred.  
 
3. The Politics of Regime Change 
  
3.1. Strategic Outlook of the Bush Administration 
 
The narrow presidential election of 2000 not only led (for the first time in over a century) to 
the inauguration of a president who had lost the popular vote; it also returned a team of for-
eign policy experts to leadership positions within the executive, who had already publicized 
their support for a policy of regime change in Iraq in a January 1998 letter to President Clin-
ton even if this entailed taking military steps without the approval of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council.11 This would not have had strong direct political consequence had not the horri-
ble events of September 11th 2001, ushered the political system into a prolonged period of 
                                                 
9 Madeleine K. Albright, The Testing of American Foreign Policy, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6, Novem-
ber/ December 1998, pp. 50-64; p. 59ff. 
10 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Worldviews 2002, Chicago/Ill. 2002, Figure 2-1. p. 16. 
11 The letter was written by the Project for a New American Century. Many of its signers later were part of the 
Bush administration such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfo-
witz, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter W. Rodman, Chairman of the De-
fense Science Board William Schneider Jr., Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, Undersecretary of 
State for Arms Control John Bolton, Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky, U.S. Am-
bassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad, National Security Council Senior Director for Southwest Asia, Near 
East and North African Affairs Elliot Abrams, and the U.S. trade representative Robert B. Zoellick. The letter 
can be accessed at www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.hthm. In 1992 in their capacities as Undersec-
retary of Defense for Policy and as a member of the National Security Council, respectively, Wolfowitz and 
Khalilzad had already called for more robust efforts to prevent the emergence of another superpower and en-
couraged the possible use of military counter-proliferation strategies against Iraq and North Korea. See Barton 
Gellman, Keeping the U.S. First; Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower, The Washington Post, March 
11, 1992. 
 5
presidential dominance within the executive branch and its constitutionally defined relation-
ship with Congress. LeLoup and Shull have pointed out that historically such situations have 
caused an acceleration of the domestic and foreign policy decision-making processes. While 
this allows the political system to quickly react to internal and external challenges, it can also 
cause Washington’s political elite to insufficiently study possible long-term results.12 Here, 
questions arise concerning Congress’ constitutionally enshrined capacity to influence the 
United States’ foreign policy through the appropriation process and oversight mechanisms.  
The administration of George W. Bush dramatically reversed the relationship of relative im-
portance to United States foreign policy between the Middle East’s two main regional thea-
ters. While the disengagement from diplomatic efforts to find a solution to the conflict be-
tween Israelis and Palestinians had predated the terrorist attacks on New York City and Wash-
ington, D.C., the military campaign that toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan was sud-
denly accompanied by a new and urgent focus on the Gulf region.13  
This fundamental strategic reversal was the result of a new vision of how to best protect na-
tional security that came to be enshrined in the National Security Strategy published by the 
White House in September 2002.14 This document has been the focus of much journalistic and 
academic attention for its stipulation of a doctrine of pre-emption that was deemed necessary 
to confront the dangers stemming from rogue states’ sponsorship of international terrorism 
and their desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction. For its critics the doctrine of pre-
emption blurred the distinction between the military pre-emption of a truly immanent threat, 
which in strictly limited circumstance might be allowed by international law, and the gener-
ally outlawed military prevention of a threat which might arise sometime in the future.15 It can 
be regarded as the outcome of the process of defining a response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
that not only was tailored to match most Americans’ expectations of a sense of leadership and 
protection emanating from the White House but also laid the rhetorical groundwork for a mili-
tary campaign against Saddam Hussein’s regime. These efforts met a public which remained 
receptive to the possibility of Iraqi involvement in 9/11 as well as to further military strikes 
                                                 
12 See LeLoup/Shull, The President and Congress, p. 256ff. 
13 The best illustration of how dramatic the change was for the new team in the White House is an article Condo-
leezza Rice wrote for Foreign Affairs at the beginning of the presidential campaign in 2000 to outline the foreign 
policy of a possible Republican administration. In line with the prevalent Republican view on national security in 
the 1990s, the relations with Russia and China were ranked on top together with the implementation of a Missile 
Defense Shield as a further priority. See Condoleezza Rice, Promoting the National Interest, in: Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 79, No. 1, January-February 2000, pp. 45-62. 
14 George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States, Washington, D.C., September 2002. 
15 Ivo H. Daalder/James M. Lindsay, American Unbound. The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, Washington, 
D.C. 2003, p. 27; John Lewis Gaddis, Grand Strategy in the Second Term, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, 
January/ February 2005, pp. 2-15, p. 3f. 
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against other targets even after the military success of the campaign against the Taliban re-
gime in Afghanistan.16 
After having framed the campaign against al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups in 
terms of war, the executive shifted the focus to the so-called axis-of-evil, which arguably is 
less of an analytical framework and more a distinct catch-phrase developed by President 
Bush’s speechwriter David Frum for domestic consumption. The president’s justification for 
broadening the focus of his administration’s “war on terror” to include states like North Ko-
rea, Iraq, and Iran rested on the argument that these regimes might possibly provide terrorists 
with weapons of mass destruction, thereby setting the tone for the case for war with Iraq.17 At 
this point, George W. Bush departed from the mainstream Republican way of thinking, which 
was represented not only by his father’s national security advisor Brent Scowcroft, but, until 
her entry into the White House, by Condoleeza Rice as well.18 In a speech at the West Point 
Military Academy, designed by his advisors to stress his credentials in national security mat-
ters at home and abroad,19 President Bush further expanded on the official policy toward the 
threat of global terrorism by adding the concept of “preemptive” military action “to take the 
battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge”.20 
Now the president could count on a public that, as in 1998, considered “international terror-
ism” (now 91 percent), “chemical and biological weapons” (86 percent) and “unfriendly 
countries gaining access to nuclear weapons” (86 percent) as the top three “threats to vital 
                                                 
16 In a survey conducted by CNN and Time Magazine on September 13, 2001, 78 percent of the respondents 
considered it to be likely that Iraq was involved in the attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. See 
Dana Milbank/Claudia Deanne, Hussein Link to 9/11 Lingers in Many Minds, in: Washington Post, September 
6, 2003. In an ABC News/Washington Post poll, 64 percent of the respondents considered the capture of Osama 
Bin Laden to be essential for the war on terror to be a success, which was only slightly higher than the 61 percent 
who saw in the ousting of Saddam Hussein another such measure. See Barry Langer, Toughest Work Ahead, 
ABC News.com, December 20, 2001, (accessed on October 5, 2004 at 
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/STRIKES_poll011220.html). 
17 David E. Sanger, Bush Aides Say Tough Tone Put Foes on Notice, in: The New York Times, January 31, 
2002; Alan Sipress/Thomas E. Ricks, No New Military Action “Imminent”, in: Washington Post, January 31, 
2002. 
18 In a hearing on Capitol Hill in April 2002, Scowcroft concluded that “(t)he most military part of this campaign 
may already be over. It is in my sense that not many states are likely to volunteer to be the next Taliban.” See 
Brent Scowcroft, Combating Terrorism: Axis of Evil. Multilateral Containment or Unilateral Confrontation? 
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations of the 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, 107th Congress, 2nd Session, April 16, 2002, p. 
12f. In her article mentioned above, Rice stated with reference to North Korea and Iraq that “(t)hese regimes are 
living on borrowed time, so there need be no sense of panic about them.” See Rice, Promoting the National In-
terest, p. 61. 
19 Mike Allen/Karen DeYoung, Bush: U.S. Will Strike First at Enemies, in: Washington Post, June 2, 2002. 
20 President Bush, Graduation Speech, West Point, June 1, 2002, (accessible at www.whitehouse.gov). See fur-
ther Thomas E. Ricks/Vernon Loeb, Bush Developing Military Policy of Striking First, in: Washington Post, 
June 10, 2002; David E. Sanger, Bush to Formalize a Defense Policy of Hitting First, in: The New York Times, 
June 17, 2002. 
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national interests.21 What was widely perceived to be a successful military campaign against 
the Taliban in Afghanistan even led 73 percent of the respondents in a poll at that time to 
agree with the general statement that the US should topple regimes that support terrorist or-
ganizations that threaten the U.S.22  
At this point President Bush’s specific understanding of the global “war on terror” converged 
with older concepts and ideas involving the restructuring of the political landscape of the 
Middle East. Robert Kagan and William Kristol claimed in January 2002 that 
  
“(a) devastating knockout blow against Saddam Hussein, followed by an American-sponsored effort to rebuild 
Iraq and put it on a path toward democratic governance, would have a seismatic impact on the Arab world – for 
the better. The Arab world may take a long time coming to terms with the West, but that process will be hastened 
by the defeat of the leading anti-western Arab tyrant. Once Iraq and Turkey – two of the three most important 
Middle Eastern powers – are both in the prowestern camp, there is a reasonable chance that smaller powers 
might decide to jump on the bandwagon.”23 
  
Prominent Middle East experts such as Fouad Ajami and Bernhard Lewis also supported a 
more confrontational approach, claiming that possible negative consequences of a war with 
Iraq would be dwarfed by the fallout that would result were the United States to shy away a 
second time from toppling Saddam Hussein. The Bush administration would therefore have to 
choose between either a complete withdrawal from the region and the hegemonic pursuit of 
its interests (“Get tough or get out”).24 In reaction to the optimistic scenarios put forward by 
leading neo-conservative thinkers, the Department of State prepared a skeptical document 
“Iraq, the Middle East and Change: No Dominoes” which was leaked to the press only a cou-
ple of days before the initiation of hostilities. In it, Foggy Bottom’s diplomats warned that the 
rapid introduction of democratic systems in the region without thorough attempts to solve the 
region’s most salient social, political, and economic woes could easily lead to the establish-
ment of a number of Islamist regimes.25 Brushing aside those concerns, President Bush de-
clared in a speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace six months after the fall 
of the regime in Baghdad: 
 
                                                 
21 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Worldviews 2002, Figure 6-5. p. 49. 
22 Ibid., Figure 3-3, p. 23. 
23 Robert Kagan/William Kristol, What to Do About Iraq, in: The Weekly Standard, Vol. 7, No. 18, January 21, 
2002. 
24 Fouad Ajami, Iraq and the Arabs’ Future, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 1, January/February 2003, p. 1-18., 
p. 18., Bernhard Lewis, Did You Say “American Imperialism”? Power, Weakness, and Choices in the Middle 
East, in: Bernhard Lewis, From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East, London 2004, p. 343-350, p. 
350. 
25 Greg Miller, Domino Theory ‘Not Credible’, in: Los Angeles Times, March 14, 2003. 
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“The failure of Iraqi democracy would embolden terrorists around the world, increase dangers to the 
American people, and extinguish the hopes of millions in the region. Iraqi democracy will succeed -- and that 
success will send forth the news, from Damascus to Teheran -- that freedom can be the future of every nation. 
The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global 
democratic revolution.   
Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did 
nothing to make us safe -- because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As 
long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, 
resentment, and violence ready for export. And with the spread of weapons that can bring catastrophic harm to 
our country and to our friends, it would be reckless to accept the status quo.”26 
 
3.2.  The Relationship between President and Congress until the War against Iraq 
 
It was in December 2001 that the first post-9/11 measure concerning Iraq was passed by a 
chamber of Congress. A Joint Resolution that to some extent mirrored the above-mentioned 
Resolution 322 of the inspection crisis of 1998 was passed in the House of Representatives on 
a 392 to 12 vote. It stated that Iraq’s refusal to allow weapons inspectors into the country was 
a “material and unacceptable breach” of its international obligations and constituted a mount-
ing threat to the United States, its friends and allies, as well as international peace and secu-
rity. The Senate Foreign Relations committee, which was still controlled by Democrats, did 
not take up the measure, thereby leaving no chance for final passage. Nevertheless, the control 
of the Senate, which before the events of September 11th, 2001, might have been used as an 
effective tool by the Democratic party to control, influence or even derail the president’s poli-
cies, lost much of its importance in a situation of “war”, where according to then Senate Mi-
nority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.), “any sign that we are losing that unity or crack in that 
support will be, I think, used against us overseas.”27 
In an effort to prevent the debate on what to do about Iraq from overshadowing the mid-term 
elections of 2002,28 the Democratic leadership in Congress therefore agreed to pass a resolu-
tion authorizing the president to use force against Iraq, even though, as Senate Majority 
Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.Dak.) pointed out in a speech on the Senate floor, this turn of 
events stood in contrast to the situation of early 1991, when the vote occurred after the presi-
                                                 
26 Peter Slevin, Powell Casts Attack on Iraq as “Liberation”, in: Washington Post, September 20, 2002. 
27 Edward Walsh, Daschle Calls for Sharing Of Plans; Information Sought in War on Terror, in: Washington 
Post, March 4, 2002. 
28 Todd Purdum, War Party; How the Republicans Got a Chestful of Medals, in: The New York Times, October 
6, 2002. 
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dent had assembled an international coalition and secured support from the United Nations.29 
The resolution To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq (PL-107-243) 
received broad majorities of 296 to 133 in the U.S. House of Representatives and of 77 to 23 
in the Senate.30 Moderate Republican Senator Lincoln Chafee (R.I.), who voted against au-
thorizing a war whose negative impact on his party’s public approval rating would ultimately 
cost him his re-election against a Democratic opponent in 2006, later pointed out that an 
amendment offered by Carl Levin (Mich.), Democratic Chairman of the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee, had called for United Nations approval before force could be authorized. In 
case of a diplomatic deadlock at the Security Council, the president would have had to ask 
Congress again for an authorization to go to war. The amendment was defeated 75 to 24 with 
all future contenders for party nomination in the 2008 voting against it.31 Just how limited the 
desire to go about the business of Congressional oversight of the executive’s actions was at 
that time was illustrated by the fact that only six senators and five representatives took the 
opportunity to study the classified 92-page National Intelligence Estimate that included all the 
cautious qualifications of the White House’s more confident public statements about Iraq’s 
alleged weapons of mass destruction program.32  
The president’s successes in shoring up public support further strengthened the cohesion of 
the Republican Party and prevented the Democratic Party from exploiting what it regarded as 
the weaknesses of the president’s domestic agenda. The Republican leadership in turn skil-
fully transformed the 2002 congressional elections into a referendum on George W. Bush’s 
handling of the “war on terror”, which at that time was still receiving high marks from a broad 
majority of the U.S. public. This strategy led unusual gains in Congress for the party that al-
ready controlled the White House.33 The result was a constellation in which, for the first time 
since the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson, one party controlled the executive and legislative 
branch during a time of war. 
 
                                                 
29 Excerpts from the Senate Debate on Authorizing Use of Force in Iraq, in: The New York Times, October 11, 
2002. 
30 Due to the six nay votes cast by moderate members of the party, the Republicans fell three votes short of the 
simple majority of 218. The strong support of nearly half of the Democratic caucus (81 out of 208) provided 
those six Republicans with the option to vote according to the sentiments of their Democrat-leaning districts. 
31 See Lincoln D. Chafee, The Senate’s Forgotten Iraq Choice, in: New York Times, March 1, 2007. Those sena-
tors were Evan Bayh (D-Ind.), Sam Brownback (R-Kans.), Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.), Christopher Dodd (D-
Conn.), John Edwards (D-N.C.), Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.), and John McCain (R-Ariz.).  
32 Dana Priest, Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized, Washington Post, April 27, 2004. 
33 In the summer of 2002, 52 percent and two thirds of Americans put more trust into the Republican capacity to 
“make the right decisions” in the fight against terrorism and to keep their country safe. Only 20 and 18 percent of 
respondents trusted the Democrats. See Kenneth White, Terrorism and the Making of American Politics, in: 
William Crotty (ed.), The Politics of Terror: the U.S. Response to 9/11, Boston/Mass. 2004, p. 37-63, p. 41. 
 10 
3.3. The Relationship between President and Congress since President Bush’s Announce-
ment of the End of Major Combat Operations in Iraq 
3.3.1.  Congress and the “Power of the Purse”      
   
One of the first real tests of presidential-congressional relations in the aftermath of the overth-
row of Saddam Hussein’s regime occurred when the Bush administration was forced to ask 
Congress for an $87 billion supplemental to fund the fighting and reconstruction in Afghanis-
tan and Iraq. Against the background of rising budget deficits, both Republicans and Democ-
rats tried to frame the debate according to what they perceived to be the wishes of their con-
stituents. Members of both parties pointed to Iraq’s oil wealth to argue for turning the $20 
billion set aside for reconstruction in this country into a loan to be repaid with the proceeds 
from Iraqi oil exports.34 After a veto threat from the White House, the bill was passed without 
turning parts of the sum into a loan by a majority of 87 to 12 in the Senate and 298 to 121 in 
the House. One interesting aspect of this vote was that after they failed with motions to sepa-
rate the more popular funding for the troops from the unpopular funding for Iraq’s reconstruc-
tion Senators John Kerry (D-Mass.) and John Edwards (D-N.C.) considered it necessary to 
vote against a bill that was considered unpopular among the Democratic base to keep their 
chances alive in a Democratic primary race dominated by the anti-war candidate Howard 
Dean. One year later, the Bush campaign was using both candidates’ “vote against the troops” 
in the debate on who might best be able to lead the country through the war in Iraq.35 
In May 2004, the White House asked Congress for an additional $25 billion for the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq to be treated as a reserve, while another full supplemental request would 
be made, according to President Bush, when the precise costs could be better estimated.36 This 
contingency fund further eroded congressional oversight, since it required the president only 
to notify Congress at least five days in advance and to deem the spending to be for “emer-
gency” needs.37 In September 2004, in a sign of growing military needs, the Bush administra-
                                                 
34 In April 2003, Andrew Natsios, director of USAID, had claimed that in total only $1.7 billion would be 
needed for Iraqi reconstruction. See Dana Milbank/Robin Wright, Off the Mark on Cost of War, Reception by 
Iraq, in: Washington Post, March 19, 2004.  
35 Jonathan Weisman, Inside the Vote to Fund War, Rebuilding, in: Washington Post, July 25, 2004. In an at-
tempt to justify his vote on this measure at a campaign rally, John Kerry made the politically disastrous remark 
“In fact, I voted for this bill, before I voted against it.” It is obvious why the Bush campaign used this sentence in 
many of its commercials to highlight Kerry’s supposed problem with “flip-flopping” on issues. See David 
Greenbery, The Strategy Beneath the Flip-Flop Label, in: Los Angeles Times, September 30, 2004; David 
Halbfinger, Kerry Says Flip-Flop Image ‘Doesn’t Reflect the Truth’, in: The New York Times, September 30, 
2004. During the televised debate between the two nominees for vice president, Dick Cheney asked how Senator 
Kerry wanted to confront al Qaeda if he is not even able to confront Howard Dean, his rival in the primaries. 
36 Jonathan Weisman, $25 Billion More Sought to Fund Wars, in: Washington Post, May 6, 2004. 
37 Dan Morgan, Congress Hesitant to Write “Blank Check”, in: Washington Post, May 14, 2004. 
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tion asked Congress to allow the diversion of $3 billion from the reconstruction fund ap-
proved as part of the larger package in the fall of 2003 to security measures. The Republican 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Richard Lugar (Ind.), was concerned that 
by decreasing funds for reconstruction, security might suffer in the long run as well.38 While 
Senator Lugar called the administration “incompetent” for not being able to spend the funds 
available for Iraqi reconstruction properly, Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) went even further, 
claiming that the U.S. was “not winning” in Iraq.39 
As early as July 2004, the congressional Government Accountability Office projected that the 
$87 billion emergency spending approved by Congress in 2003 was about $12 billion less 
than actually needed.40 Therefore, it came as no surprise that before the end of fiscal year 
2004 on September 30th, 2004, the Pentagon was forced to start using the above-mentioned 
$25 billion “emergency fund” that was originally supposed to be available only after October 
1st. While the White House maintained that the main reason for allocating the necessary fund-
ing outside of the regular budget process was the uncertainty of the conditions in Iraq, De-
mocratic and Republican critics have claimed that these measures were a way of trying to 
keep these costs separate from the issue of a rising budget deficit.41 When the Senate unanim-
ously and without major debate voted in May 2005 to pass a bill including another $82 billion 
in supplementary military spending, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Ten.) demonstrated 
his satisfaction: “Our brave men and women in uniform will not relent in their fight against 
terror, and we must not relent in our support of them.” Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton (D-
N.Y.) spoke for many Democrats when she expressed her concern about the procedure: “Hav-
ing this supplemental, unfortunately with the big title of emergency over it, appears to be an 
effort to rush things through to avoid congressional oversight and scrutiny.”42  
The approaching mid-term elections of 2006 put the ruling party in Washington, D.C. under 
pressure to reconcile funding requests for the military operations in Iraq with their domestic 
spending priorities. Given the fact that a considerable share of U.S. military personnel in Iraq 
continued to be provided by part-time army national guards and reservists, leading Republi-
cans such as House Majority Whip Roy Blunt (R-Mo.) called for an increase in regular active 
                                                 
38 David Stout, Senators See Budget Shift on Iraq as Sign of Trouble, in: The New York Times, September 15, 
2004. 
39 Brian Knowles, G.O.P. Senators Voice Rising Concerns on Iraq, in: The New York Times, September 19, 
2004. 
40 John Hendon, Cash-Strapped Pentagon Taps Emergency Fund, in: Los Angeles Times, September 22, 2004. 
41 Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Congressional Unit Analyzes Military Costs in Iraq, in: The New York Times, Novem-
ber 1, 2003; John Hendon, Cash-Strapped Pentagon Taps Emergency Fund.  
42 See, David D. Kirkpatrick, Congress Approves Financing to Fight Wars and Terrorism, in: The New York 
Times, May 11, 2005. 
 12 
military personnel.43 In his “Chairman’s Risk Assessment”, an annual report required by 
Congress, Gen. Richard Meyers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, acknowledged that, 
although the U.S. military might still win simultaneous conflicts, it would, due to the deple-
tion of its resources during the war in Iraq, be forced to do so over a longer period and with 
more casualties on both sides.44 In the end, president and Congress have the option of financ-
ing higher defense appropriations through higher budget deficits or taxes, something that 
many Republican voters would reject, or by scaling back of other government expenditures, 
which the Democratic Party would use to mobilize their supporters and independents. 
 
3.3.2. Congressional Oversight and the “Abu Ghraib” Investigations   
      
The pictures documenting the torture and humiliation of Iraqi prisoners in a camp run by two 
U.S. Military Police Battalions and a Military Intelligence Brigade sparked the first detailed 
public congressional inquiry into the conduct of military operations in Iraq after President 
Bush had announced their end in May 2003. This also provides an interesting case study of 
presidential-congressional relations at the beginning of the presidential election campaign that 
had just started in earnest after John Kerry’s victory in the Democratic primaries in March 
2004.  
Since senators of both parties consider the privilege of being informed by all government 
agencies to be an essential part of their constitutionally enshrined prerogative of congressional 
oversight, the Republican chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Pat Roberts 
(Kans.), reflected the sentiments of many of his colleagues when he described the lack of in-
formation-sharing on behalf of the Department of Defense, its Defense Intelligence Agency, 
and the Central Intelligence Agency as “unacceptable”.45 While many Democrats, including 
presidential candidate John Kerry, immediately demanded the resignation of Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld, a number of Republicans, including Senators Graham (S.C.), McCain 
(Ariz.), and Hagel (Neb.), tried to steer a course that demonstrated the independence of their 
personas and offices without too overtly breaking party discipline.46 Since public opinion 
showed a clear majority of seventy percent in favor of not forcing Donald Rumsfeld to resign, 
President Bush was able to use his dual role as commander-in-chief and leader of a party that 
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planned to defend both the White House and Congress in the up-coming elections to force an 
end to the debate on the future of his secretary of defense by publicly supporting him.47 
After the Republican chairman of the Senate Armed Service Committee, Senator John Warner 
(R-Va.), continued to hold televised hearings on prisoner abuse, his Republican counterpart 
on the House Armed Services Committee, Representative Duncan Hunter (Calif.), charged 
that the “Senate has become mesmerized by cameras”.48 This statement reflected the some-
times precarious relationship between the members of the two chambers. While the House of 
Representatives is naturally more inclined to take electoral politics into consideration, many 
senators think of themselves as “above politics” in fulfilling the constitutional duty of control-
ling the executive branch of government. Many House Republicans were therefore increas-
ingly worried about a downward trend in the public’s perception of the war in Iraq, which 
their party portrayed as an essential part of the global “war on terror”. Equally important in 
this case was the fact that the Republican leadership in the House was more in line with the 
president’s conservative agenda than was the case in the Senate, in which moderate Re-
publicans yielded much greater influence. Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann, veteran ana-
lysts of congressional politics, have pointed out that the 12 hours of testimony on Abu Ghraib 
taken by Republicans in the House of Representatives contrasted starkly with their 140 hours 
of testimony on “whether President Clinton had used his Christmas mailing list to find poten-
tial campaign donors.”49 When Representative John P. Murtha (Penn.), Vietnam veteran and 
long-time champion of the U.S. military within the Democratic Party, publicly declared that 
the war in Iraq could only be won by significantly increasing its military presence, Republican 
Majority Leader Tom Delay (Tex.) attacked him for engaging in a “political stunt”.50 Whereas 
the Senate passed Resolution 356, which commended all “Americans serving nobly” in Iraq, 
condemned the events that had occured at Abu Ghraib, offered an apology for the humiliation, 
and expressed a belief in the benefits of a full investigations of all alleged abuses by its ap-
propriate committees by 92 votes to 0, a nearly identical measure was never voted on in the 
House.  
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In addition, the rules of the Senate provide single members, and especially Committee chair-
men, with much greater leeway in conducting their business than in the tightly controlled 
House. In the end, the independence demonstrated by Senator Warner reportedly earned him a 
spot on the short-list of possible nominees for secretary of defense of both a Bush and Kerry 
White House.51 With the party conventions in Boston and New York quickly approaching, 
this election year example of congressional oversight came to a close. However, the admini-
stration was reminded of this case’s long-term fall-out when a year later Senator Richard J. 
Durbin (D-Ill.) successfully inserted a provision into the next emergency spending bill for 
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq that barred the government from using any of the 
newly appropriated money to subject anyone in American custody, including foreigners, to 
torture or any treatment forbidden by the Constitution.52 
 
3.4. Intra-executive Dynamics 
3.4.1. The Problem of Pre-War Intelligence 
 
The doctrine of pre-emption put a new focus on the capabilities not only of the Department of 
Defense, but also and especially on those of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The mat-
ter of Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction program was not the first time that intelli-
gence information proved to be incomplete. This can be explained by the structural relation-
ship between the realms of intelligence and politics. Intelligence information, which contra-
dicts the dominant reading of events within the executive, especially the White House, tends 
to be neglected. This has been the case with both Democratic and Republican presidents. 
In a famous example that has repercussions for U.S. policy toward the Gulf region yet today; 
the CIA was not able to agree on a necessarily pessimistic National Intelligence Estimate con-
cerning the stability of the Shah regime in Iran in summer 1978. This happened mainly be-
cause it would have contradicted the view held in the Carter White House that the Shah re-
gime would be able to survive the domestic upheaval of those days. As a result, Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s seizure of power came as a shock to policy-makers whose reliance on the Shah 
became one reason for a trouble U.S.-Iranian relationship.53 Another example, which was not 
directly related to the Middle East, but even more significant in its global repercussions was 
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the refusal of politically appointed officials within the CIA in the 1980s to accept reports from 
lower-ranking analysts describing the Soviet Union’s decreasing military and economic capa-
bilities, because such information would not have supported the White House’s view of a con-
tinuing Soviet threat.54  
In the case of the war with Iraq, U.S. intelligence agencies have admitted to not having taken 
reports by Iraqi defectors seriously which revealed that their home country had abandoned 
programs for the production of weapons of mass destruction. Given the experience of the sec-
ond Gulf War, a consensus within the intelligence community about Iraq’s possession of such 
weapons had solidified, which caused contrary accounts given by Iraqis to be seen as being 
part of a disinformation campaign by Saddam Hussein.55 An internal CIA publication, there-
fore, acknowledged “tradecraft weaknesses”, while defending the way some conclusions that 
were later proven false.56 
A Senate Intelligence Committee report,57 whose publication coincided with the resignation 
of CIA Director George J. Tenet, concluded with strong criticism of the agency’s reporting on 
Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction as well as with praise for its warning 
about the lack of evidence for an established relationship between the regime of Saddam Hus-
sein and Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda.58 Originally, the CIA was willing to declassify only 
one half of the committee’s report. However in a sign of the Senate trying to resume its over-
sight role, long negotiations between the agency and the committee brought about an agree-
ment that left only one fifth of the document classified.59 The ranking Democrat on the com-
mittee, Senator John D. Rockefeller IV (W.Va.), claimed that had the information about the 
lack of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq been available to the Senate from the beginning, it 
would not have passed the resolution to authorize the president to use force against Iraq with a 
majority of 77 to 23 votes. While this assessment might be explained by partisan calculation, 
it seems interesting that the Republican chairman of the committee, Pat Roberts, said that, al-
though he might still have voted to give the president the desired authority, he would have 
                                                 
54 Kimberly Marten Zisk, The Threat of Soviet Decline: The CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the End of the 
Cold War, in: Randall B. Ripley/James M. Lindsay (eds.), U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War, Pittsburgh 
1997, pp. 160-181, p. 161f. 
55 James Risen, CIA Held Back Iraqi Arms Data, U.S. Officials Say, in. The New York Times, July 6, 2004; 
Douglas Jehl, U.S., Certain That Iraq Had Illicit Arms, Reportedly Ignored Contrary Reports, in: The New York 
Times, March 6, 2004. 
56 Douglas Jehl, C.I.A. Review is Critical of Prewar Iraq Analysis, in: The New York Times, September 22, 
2004. 
57 The full 521-page report can be accessed at http://intelligence.senate.gov/iraqreport2.pdf. 
58 Dana Milbank/Walter Pincus, As Rationales for War Erode, Issue of Blame Looms Large, in: Washington 
Post, July 10, 2004. 
59 Douglas Jehl, Doubts on Informant Deleted in Senate Text, in: The New York Times, July 13, 2004. 
 16 
considered a possible war to be more like “Bosnia and Kosovo”,60 two military operations that 
had been deemed by many Republicans in Congress as having no relevance for U.S. national 
security. Chairman Roberts then decided to break up the remaining investigation into five 
different parts, tackling in detail the post-war findings on Saddam Hussein’s connections to 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the intelligence community’s use of information 
provided by Ahmed Chalabi’s INC and intelligence assessments of post-war Iraq. The final 
segments were to deal with the activities conducted by the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans 
under former Undersecretary of Defense Douglas J. Feith as well as with the administration’s 
public statements on Iraq.61  
When at the height of the presidential race in the fall of 2004, classified intelligence estimates 
were leaked to the press that painted a considerably more skeptical picture of the situation in 
Iraq than the President at his campaign appearances a public debate erupted on the nature of 
the relationship between the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency, where many 
employees felt they were being unjustifiably criticized for the nature of pre-war intelligence.62 
An editorial of the Wall Street Journal, which had previously endorsed the war with Iraq, 
stated that the Bush administration had at that time “two insurgencies to defeat: the one that 
the CIA is struggling to help put down in Iraq and the other inside Langley against the Bush 
administration.”63  
In this intra-executive relationship one main problem arose from the institutional arrangement 
that gives the CIA director nominal authority over the intelligence community, on the one 
hand, while the Department of Defense and its secretary control most of the community’s 
budget and personal, on the other hand. The scandal of the possible dissemination of highly 
sensitive U.S. intelligence information to Iran by Ahmad Chalabi, who was the main Iraqi ally 
of neo-conservatives within the Pentagon and one of the main recipients of U.S. aid autho-
rized by the above-mentioned Iraq Liberation Act, further strained the relationship between 
the CIA and the Department of Defense. Until a raid on the INC headquarters in Baghdad in 
May 2003, the Defense Intelligence Agency paid the organization led by Chalabi $340,000 a 
month for supplying intelligence before and after the U.S. invasion in March 2003.64 This 
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financing had only been restored by the Pentagon in January 2002, after the State Department 
had earlier cut the funds to the group over accounting disputes.65 In the United States, the pos-
sibility of Ahmed Chalabi informing the Iranian government that the United States had broken 
the codes used by Iranian intelligence led to an FBI investigation of several Pentagon em-
ployees.66 Moreover, in the eyes of early critics, the heavy reliance on exiles surrounding 
Ahmed Chalabi further negatively affected the broader Iraqi public’s perception of the Coali-
tion Provisional Authority.67   
In the run-up to the war, one of Chalabi’s strongest supporters in Washington, D.C., Richard 
Perle, who served on the Pentagon’s advisory Defense Policy Board, had publicly criticized 
the CIA for having become “wedded to theory” that left no room for the possibility that Iraq 
was working with al Qaeda. This assessment led Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz 
with the approval of Donald Rumsfeld to create a separate analytical entity within the Depart-
ment of Defense. This entity was headed by Douglas Feith, the undersecretary of defense for 
policy, who was equally displeased with the CIA’s inability to find conclusive evidence of a 
link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda and with the CIA’s skepticism about the reliabil-
ity of Iraqi sources provided by Ahmed Chalabi.68 According to a February 2007 report by the 
Department of Defense’s Inspector General the activities of the group led by Feith were not 
illegal, but they were “inappropriate, given that the intelligence assessments were presented 
as intelligence products and did not show the variance with the consensus of the intelligence 
community.”69  
The creation of the office of a Director of National Intelligence in December 2004, in charge 
of coordinating the efforts of the CIA and 14 other intelligence organizations, did not eradi-
cate the potential for further conflict with the Department of Defense, since then Secretary 
Rumsfeld continued to be wary of loosing control of those Pentagon agencies like the Na-
tional Security Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and the National Recon-
naissance Office, which due to the restructuring now fell under the authority of the new direc-
tor of National Intelligence.70  
 
                                                 
65 Todd Pudrum, After Saddam; Now What?; in: The New York Times, February 17, 2002. 
66 David Johnston/James Risen, Polygraph Testing Starts at Pentagon in Chalabi Inquiry, in: The New York 
Times, June 3, 2004. 
67 Daniel Byman/Kenneth Pollack/Gideon Rose, The End of the Chalabi Affair?, posted on foreignaffairs.org on 
May 26, 2004. 
68 James Risen, How Pair’s Finding on Terror Led to Clash on Shaping Intelligence, in: The New York Times, 
April 28, 2004; David Johnston/James Risen, Polygraph Testing Starts at Pentagon in Chalabi Inquiry. 
69 Quoted in Greg Miller/Julian E. Barnes, CIA doubts didn’t deter Feith’s team, in: Los Angeles Times, Febru-
ary 10, 2007 (emphasis added). 
70 Walter Pincus, Rumsfeld Memo on Intelligence Criticized, in: Washington Post, April 8, 2005. 
 18 
3.4.2. The Departments of State and Defense and the Matter of Post-War Planning in Iraq
         
Since the beginning of the Bush administration’s campaign against terrorism, much has been 
written about the relationship between the Departments of State and Defense and their 
respective views on how this campaign should have been conducted. Early on, the press 
elaborated on the differences between the approach of the civilian leadership of the Pentagon 
that emphasized the use of military power against Iraq and the State Department under Colin 
Powell that saw new diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict between Israelis and 
Palestinians as the logical next step after the successful military campaign in Afghanistan.71 
The internal Republican debate of the summer of 2002 that was prompted by leading figures 
of the Republican establishment who were considered to be close to Secretary Powell could 
be regarded as a spill-over of this intra-executive dispute into the public arena.72  
In April 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz claimed that the “shaming effect” 
of Saddam’s fall from power would profoundly affect other regimes in the region.73 With that 
in mind, Newt Gingrich strongly criticized the State Department’s willingness to step up rela-
tions with Syria and Iran which he considered another example of Foggy Bottom’s “diplo-
matic failures” that ranged from the inability to effectively communicate Washington’s inter-
ests to the possible negation of the positive effects of the military campaign against Iraq 
through an unwarranted emphasis on cooperative approaches. The fact that the Pentagon did 
not distance itself from Gingrich’s comments and the public comment made by Richard Ar-
mitage, Assistant Secretary of State, that Gingrich might simply lack “medicine and therapy” 
underscored the poisoned relationship between the two departments.74 
With the quick success of the military operation that led to the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, proponents of the Rumsfeld doctrine, which put emphasis on a small number of 
highly maneuverable ground forces, special operations, and high-tech air power,75 seemed to 
have been vindicated against cautious voices such as Eric Shinseki’s pre-war assessment as 
the Army Chief of Staff, who expected a necessary ground force of “a couple of hundred 
                                                 
71 Patrick E. Tyler, In Washington, a Struggle to Define the Next Fight, in: The New York Times, December 2, 
2001. 
72 Peter Grier, Behind US rifts on hitting Iraq, in: Christian Science Monitor, August 21, 2002; Todd S. Pur-
dum/Patrick E. Tyler, Top Republicans Break with Bush on Iraq Strategy, in: The New York Times, August 16, 
2002; Brent Scowcroft, Don’t Attack Saddam, in: Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2002. 
73 Bill Gertz/Rowan Scarborough, ‘Shaming Effect’ on Arab World, in: Washington Post, April 29, 2003. 
74 Brian Knowlton, Gingrich Assails State Department and Calls for Overhaul, in: New York Times, June 17, 
2003; Jonathan E. Kaplan, Did Gingrich get nod for AEI speech?, in: The Hill, April 30, 2003, 
http://www.thehill.com/news/043003/gingrich.aspx accessed on April 30, 2003. 
75 Brad Knickerbocker, How Iraq will change US military doctrine, in: The Christian Science Monitor, July 2, 
2004. 
 19
thousand” troops.76 However, the continuing violence in Iraq demonstrated that this doctrine 
did not include the appropriate means of dealing with the kind of counterinsurgency the 
United States had not faced since Vietnam, as has been pointed out by a study of the mostly 
Pentagon-financed Rand Corporation, which criticized the Pentagon’s leadership for its fail-
ure to learn from “historical lessons” in the fight against Iraqi insurgents.77 Senator John 
McCain (R-Ariz.) therefore used the platform of congressional hearings to openly express 
dissatisfaction with what was considered to be an inability of the Pentagon’s military leader-
ship to actively challenge the civilian leadership’s strategies.78    
 
4. The Politics of Withdrawal and the Return of Divided Government 
 
Until well after his reelection, President Bush benefited from the fact that developments 
within Iraq such as the capture of Saddam Hussein, the transfer of sovereignity, and the 
various Iraqi elections and referenda created powerful “images of progress” which he could 
point to in debates with his political rivals.79 His standing was additionally bolstered by the 
ability of the White House and its political allies to cast the military effort in Iraq as being 
part of the global war on terror.80 On the other hand, this meant that President Bush’s 
approval rating as well as the public’s perception of the war would by directly affected by 
negative developments in both arenas.  
In the aftermath of the elections for Iraq’s constitutional assembly in January 2005, former 
Republican secretaries of state Kissinger and Shultz argued forcefully against “articifial 
timelines” for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.81 They were supported in this by the 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff who were concerned that timetables might entice the enemies of the 
U.S. presence in Iraq to try to repeat the events of “Beirut and Somalia”.82 However, critics 
such as James Steinberg, deputy national security advisor under President Clinton, saw the 
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announcement of a deadline for withdrawal as the most effective way of countering the 
Sunni-led guerilla war and terrorist campaign.83 Those voices started to find their echo in 
Congress, when, in a rather unusual combination, Republican Ron Paul (Tex.), the leading 
representative of his party’s isolationist wing, teamed up with Republican Walter Jones (N.C.) 
and Democrats Neil Abercrombie (Hawaii) and Dennis Kucinich (Ohio) to initiate a 
resolution that called for the withdrawal of all combat forces by October 1, 2006.84 In another 
sign that a more forceful opposition to the war in Iraq was beginning to take shape in late 
2005, Congressman John Murtha (D-Pa.) reversed his stance of mid-2004 and called for a 
withdrawal of all combat troops within six months and the stationing of a rapid reaction 
force.85 Nancy Pelosi’s (D-Cal.) decision to adopt Murtha’s stance for her party met with the 
disaproval of her deputy Steny Hoyer (Md.) who believed that “a precipitous withdrawal of 
American forces in Iraq could lead to disaster, spawning civil war, fostering a haven for 
terrorists and damaging our nation’s security and credibility.”86 Their contrasting views 
reflected similar disagreements among the party’s foreign policy experts with President 
Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski supporting an immediate withdrawal 
and Richard Holbrooke, President Clinton’s ambassador to the United Nations, as well as 
Madeleine Albright (“This is a war of choice, not necessity, but getting it right is a necessity 
and not a choice.”) arguing against it.87 Interestingly, after the 2006 mid-term elections, 
Speaker-elect Nancy Pelosi credited Murtha, who lost his intra-party bid against Hoyer to 
become majority leader, with laying the groundwork for the Democratic victory.88  
Taking up the ultimately unsuccessful challenge to move the debate into more favorable 
terrain, President Bush and Vice President Cheney began to more forcefully use the “bully 
pulpit” to influence public opinion. In doing so, they emphasized what they described as the 
disastrous results of an early withdrawal from Iraq. President Bush warned about the Islamist 
terrorists’ “fanatic and extreme plan” to build a “radical Islamist imperium ranging from 
Spain to Indonesia”, which would aim to “destroy Israel”, “bully Europe” and threaten the 
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United States “into isolation”.89 His Republican allies in the Senate stymied a Democratic 
attempt to pass a resolution calling for a specific plan for withdrawal. Instead, the Senate 
called with 79 to 19 votes upon the president to use the year 2006 to lay the groundwork for a 
“gradual withdrawal” and commited the White House to issuing progress reports every ninety 
days.90 The more partisan and tightly controlled House of Representatives reacted with House 
Resolution 612 which declared “artificial timelines” as “fundamentally inconsistent” with 
victory in Iraq.  
With the ccombination of a lack of significant “signs of progress” and an increasing level of 
violence, even the relative unity of the Republican Party and its control of both the White 
House and Congress did not shield it from the political fallout of rising voter dissatisfaction. 
For the first time, in the summer of 2006, a majority of the U.S. public started to view the war 
in Iraq as being distinct from the broader war on terror.91 Republican efforts to reverse this 
trend were further undermined when the Senate Intelligence Committee issued two of its five 
remaining reports on prewar intelligence in September 2006. Chairman Roberts’s efforts to 
stall their publication until after the mid-term elections failed when Senators Olympia Snowe 
(R-Maine) and Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) broke ranks with their party to support their Democ-
ratic colleagues in making the results available to the public. This was of profound political 
significance since the reports made the strong warnings members of the intelligence commu-
nity had already issued about the Bush administration’s allegation of a strong link between 
Saddam Hussein and al Qaida in the run-up to the war publicly available. With the campaign 
season for the mid-term elections of 2006 in full swing, Republican chairman Pat Roberts 
found himself in the awkward position of having to urge the public to ignore the findings of 
his own committee.92 
With the Democratic control of Congress and the return of divided government, the issues of 
oversight and the funding for the war in Iraq received new attention. In view of the continuing 
public dissatisfaction with the war effort and an increasing public willingness to consider the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country, lawmakers of the new majority had to find a way 
to challenge the president without endangering their newly-won position or their party’s 
chances of capturing the White House in 2008. With one in five Americans supporting imme-
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diate withdrawal and another fifty percent supporting a timetable, public opinion seemed to be 
on the side of the Democrats.93 In their effort to reign in President Bush’s Iraq policies, they 
could choose between non-binding statements of disapproval and a focus on oversight while 
giving the president enough leverage to deal with the military aspects of the war or they could 
use a cut-off in funding to force the president to stop the war. While the first option does not 
nearly go as far towards ending the war as the liberal wing of the Democratic party wants, the 
moderate wing of the party could point to the fact that attaching conditions to supplemental 
funding would interfere with the constitutionally-enshrined responsibilities of the president’s 
function as commander-in-chief.94 A third option, which was first put forward by Senator 
Edward Kennedy, but initially failed to be picked up by his colleagues, was to effectively re-
peal the authorization for war given in 2002, since it was supposedly limited to the direct 
challenge to Saddam Hussein’s regime and did not cover interference in a ‘civil war’.95 
Whichever option prevails, it will ultimately face the possibility of a presidential veto thereby 




Summarizing the relationship between president and Congress during the Clinton administra-
tion as it relates to U.S. policy toward the Gulf region, one can easily detect a pattern of rhe-
torical congressional leadership, which led the executive into cooperation on legislation that, 
in comparison to the policies originating from the White House, could be considered mostly 
symbolic. 
This changed dramatically when the events of September 11, 2001 resulted in a sharp increase 
in public support for an administration that had a clear view on how to proceed in the region. 
However, in retrospect, the doctrine of pre-emption developed by the Bush administration 
seemed to be tied specifically to the case of Iraq, resulting from a confluence of mostly do-
mestic considerations and developments. It is therefore possible to claim that, contrary to ear-
lier assessments,96 the NSS 2002 is more of a public relations document that explained the 
case for war with Iraq to both an international and domestic audience rather than the equiva-
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lent of a historic vision such as the one that was outlined more than fifty years ago by Paul 
Nitze and the other “wise men” of the Truman administration and functioned as the concep-
tual framework for the confrontation with perceived Soviet expansionism.97  
Until November 2006, the relationship between the executive and legislative branches during 
the Bush administration, was characterized by executive dominance. Even though the Senate, 
unlike the House, which until 2006 remained effectively controlled by the Republican leader-
ship surrounding Speaker Dennis Hastert (Ill.) and Majority Leader Tom DeLay (Tex.) and 
his successor John Boehner (Ohio), tried to engage in oversight, the traditional play of checks 
and balances between the two branches of government was severely limited by the fact that, 
for the first time since the Democratic Party’s dominance at the outset of the Vietnam War, a 
single party controlled Congress and the White House during the country’s involvement in a 
sustained military engagement abroad.  
On the other hand, the U.S. public’s increasing dissatisfaction with the developments in Iraq 
pushed a reluctant Congress towards a closer examination of White House policies. The pub-
lic’s eroding confidence in the president’s ability to successfully manage the war in Iraq and 
the ongoing ethics disputes surrounding Republicans Tom DeLay (Tex.) and Tom Foley (Fla.) 
generated a political momentum that contributed to the Republican loss of Congressional ma-
jorities in the mid-term elections of 2006. While the results of the 2006 election and the con-
tinuing voter dissatisfaction with the war in Iraq raised the spectre of more muscular congres-
sional involvement in U.S. policy toward the Gulf region, thereby ending nearly six years of 
minimal congressional oversight, President Bush and his foreign policy staff can count on the 
fact that the Constitution provides them with enough leeway to conduct the war as they see fit 
until Congress overcomes the major hurdle of establishing veto-proof majorities to end the 
funding for the war.  
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